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LLOYD BURTON*

Disputing Distributions
in a Shrinking Commons:
The Case of Drought
in California
INTRODUCTION
In 1808 Gabriel Moraga led a party of Spanish explorers up the
northern half of California's Central Valley. There they found wetlands
teeming with all manner of aquatic life, huge herds of elk, and flocks of
migratory waterfowl stretching literally as far as the eye could see.
In combination with the rich alluvial soils and mild climate of the
region, what made this abundance of life possible was the majestic river
flowing southward down through the valley. One of the great freshwater
resources of the world, it annually moved 22 million acre-feet (seven trillion gallons) of water from Sierra Nevada snowmelt and coastal range
runoff down to the delta at the valley's base, and then westward to San
Francisco Bay and the Pacific Ocean. The name Moraga gave the river was
the Spanish Catholic term for the sacred expressed in material form: the
1
Sacramento.
Needless to say, that first European snapshot of the Sacramento
Valley and its river delta bears scant resemblance to current conditions.
Swamp and marsh have long since given way to drained and irrigated
farmland, which is itself now yielding to rapid urban expansion. All of the
elk and many of the fish, waterfowl, and other wildlife are gone, along
with much of the water that used to flow to the sea.
About three fourths of California's average annual precipitation
occurs north of the delta formed by the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers east of San Francisco Bay, just north of the state's geographic midpoint. Yet three-fourths of the human demand for water is to the south, in
the croplands of the much drier San Joaquin Valley and in the sprawling
metropolises of southern California.2 To overcome what former governor
and water mover Pat Brown called this "accident of people and geogra*Dr. Lloyd Burton is an associate professor in the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the
University of Colorado at Denver and is Denver campus director of the university's Program
on Global Change and Environmental Quality.
1. W. A. Beck and D. A. Williams, California-A History of the State 213 (1972); W. Bean,
California-An InterpretativeHistory 43 (3rd ed. 1978).
2. Water Education Foundation, California Water Map (1991), col. 1.
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phy,"3 government engineers have, during this century, managed to reroute most of the water in the state from where nature was sending it to
where the human population wanted it. As a result, the state is now
served by what is certainly the largest and probably the most complex
man-made water distribution system in the world.
Unfortunately, even after decades of effort exerted, billions of dollars expended, and hundreds of miles of concrete poured, the supply of
water delivered is still not always equal to demand for its use. As evidenced especially in the droughts of the 1930s, the 1970s, and the 1980s,
there seems to be no foreseeable end to the running competition between
expanding demand for and artificially enhanced supplies of the state's
surface waters. Rivaling in complexity and diversity the technology of
surface water distribution in California is its institutional organization of
that distribution. And just as the state's physical water allocation facilities
have been stressed beyond their ability to perform reliably and efficiently
during this latest drought episode, so too have the legal and regulatory
mechanisms responsible for making those distribution decisions.
This article describes the findings of research conducted in California during the summer of 1991, in the fifth year of one of the most prolonged and severe droughts in the state's recorded history. The research
project was designed to answer three questions. First, among competing
users of a commonly held resource (in this case, water) how did a dramatic decline in the availability of that resource affect levels of user conflict in the governmental institutions responsible for its orderly
distribution? Second, what theoretical perspectives best explain why the
disputing behavior of resource users and user groups took the form it did?
And third, what lessons does this application of theory to empirical observation have to teach us regarding the institutional management of conflicts over shrinkage in the size of common pool resources in the future?
In the following section of this article I briefly describe how surface waters are ultimately distributed to end-users and user groups in California; the emphasis in this sketch is on the public institutions responsible
for making and enforcing allocation decisions, with particular reference to
their dispute resolution processes. Then comes a discussion of the actual
incidence of distributional disputes in these institutions, as portrayed in
state agency files on administrative water rights complaints over the last
15 years (spanning two major droughts), and in a series of structured
interviews I conducted with representatives of several large institutional
user groups in coastal California.
Following that is a reflection on why the incidence of disputing
behavior at different levels of the water distribution system assumed the
pattern that it did during the most recent drought. Literature on the gov3. Bean, supra note 1,at 400.
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ernance and management of common pool resources, from which this
paper benefits and to which it contributes, 4 has proven especially useful
for interpreting and understanding these field observations. Finally, the
paper closes with a discussion of lessons to be learned from this study of
institutional responses to drought, with special attention given to the
problem of conflict management in governing the use of common pool
resources during periods when the availability of that resource is in
decline.
The most obvious application of these lessons will be to water
shortages elsewhere in the western United States. If the best current estimates of global circulation modelers are correct, 5 over the next third of a
century the American Southwest may experience a 20-30 percent drop in
the flow of the Colorado River as a result of global warming. Like California, then, other western states may be forced to deal not only with sharply
limited water supplies, but with equally precipitous declines in the availability of timber, livestock rangeland, fisheries, and hydroelectric
power-other resources that are commonly held and competitively used.
And even if the worst does not come to pass climatically, the habitat maintenance requirements of legislation such as the Endangered Species Act (if
it survives the reauthorization process intact) and Marine Mammal Protection Act may pose increasingly significant restrictions on the ability of
user groups to maximally exploit the natural resource commons. User
groups in eastern states are also facing greater competition for finite surface and groundwater supplies, and a considerable amount of high-quality groundwater has been rendered unusable by toxic industrial
contamination.
In short, we need to learn as much as we can as quickly as we can
about the role of conflict in shrinking common pool resource management. As depicted below, the most recent experience of drought in California is rife with cases of reactive, paralytic, environmentally destructive
disputing behavior; but it also includes examples of the institution of
more efficient, less costly new water management practices adopted with
a minimum of user conflict and which enjoy wide popular support. The
drought of the late 1980s was not the first nor will it be the last time the
state has been called upon to socially as well as technically manage shortages in its commonly held natural resources; and it is surely the kind of
experience that other local and regional resource managing institutions
will face more in the future than they have in the past.
4. Of particular relevance were Elinor Ostrom's Governingthe Commons (1990) and Maass
and Anderson's... And the Desert Shall Rejoice (1986).
5. Current findings are summarized and reinterpreted in P. Gleick and L. Nash, The Societal and Environmental Costs of the Continuing California Drought. Berkeley, CA.: Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security (July, 1991).
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DISTRIBUTION OF CALIFORNIA'S SURFACE WATERS:
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS,
AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Metaphorically, institutional relationships for distributing water
in California can be likened to the root system of a large and growing tree.
At the top of the root system-the tree trunk just below ground level-are
the institutions responsible for making and enforcing all original surface
water rights decisions in California: the State Water Resource Control
Board (SWRCB) and the courts. At the next level down are those public
institutions that acquire a very large water right from above, then build
impoundment and diversion facilities to appropriate that water in order
to sell and deliver it to end users and end user groups at the level below
them. It is therefore a metaphorical root system than works in reversedrawing water down through the institutions the people of California
have constitutionally empowered to make all primary allocation decisions, and assigning rights both to end users and to those who will service
end users.
Although there are many variations on and some exceptions to
the simplified description given below, for the purposes of analysis in this
study water distribution in California will be characterized as occurring
principally at these three distribution levels or tiers (depicted in Figure 1).
As shown, different combinations of functions are performed at different
levels of the system. Tier 1 distributors (SWRCB and the courts) are
responsible only for the assignments of rights and for overseeing the exercise of these rights. Tier 2 distributors acquire the right from Tier 1 institutions, assign subsidiary use interests to Tier 3 distributors (usually by
means of delivery contracts), physically provide the water, and monitor
contract compliance. Tier 3 distributors acquire water either by the assignment of a right from Tier 1 or contractual agreements with Tier 2 distributors (or, riot infrequently, both); Tier 3 distributors then assign subsidiary
use interests to end users (e.g., residential water users, businesses, farmers), deliver the water to them, and monitor its use. Unlike Tier 2 distributors, who acquire rights only for the purpose of delivering water to the
next level down, Tier 3 distributors are mostly organizations of end users,
such as municipal water companies or agricultural conservancy districts.
Provided below is a more in-depth discussion of each of these distribution
tiers and the ways in which the institutions at each level perform their
authorized functions, including the handling of disputes over distributional decisions.

.

't

th
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Tier 1 Distributors
The California Constitution declares that all surface waters
appropriated and put to any use are subject to state regulation and control.6 As early as 1913, the state legislature vested in one centralized
administrative agency the authority to make primary allocations to applicants for a water right under the statutorily established principles of prior
appropriation. 7 Under this doctrine, the first party to divert and reasonably, beneficially use a specified quantity of previously unappropriated
water acquires a continuing right to its use; such rights are inferior to all
those previously established on the same watercourse, and superior to
those established later. All holders of an appropriative right from the same
surface water source thus stand in an absolute chronological hierarchy in
relation to each other; in dry years, the rights of the most senior appropriators must be fully honored before the more junior appropriators can take
any water at all.8 Furthermore, appropriative rights are subject to forfeiture for nonuse; any nonpublic appropriator that fails over time to use its
allotted amount may involuntarily lose the unused portion of the right to
9
another appropriator who claims it.
Unlike many other arid western states, however, California also
continues to recognize water rights established under the conflicting common law doctrine of riparianism. 10 A riparian right is acquired through
the purchase of land bordering on a source of surface water. The water
must be 'reasonably used' on the adjoining land; but unlike an appropriative right, a riparian water right is not specifically limited in quantity, is
not lost through nonuse, and exists independently of the demands of
appropriators. In times of short supply even the most senior appropriators
may not harm the rights of riparians sharing the same source of surface
11
water.
Also unlike most other western states, the state regulation of
groundwater in California is nearly as weak and diffuse as its control of
surface water is centralized and pervasive. Except in instances where it
can be shown that groundwater withdrawals are directly harming the
rights of appropriators, state government has very limited authority to
intrude upon the pumping practices of groundwater rights holders (a
right generally acquired through the purchase of overlying land).' 2 What
the legislature has done, however, is to make statutory provision for local
6. Cal. Const art. XIV, §1.
7. 1913 Cal. Stat. 1012, 1923 Cal. Stat. 162, Cal. Water Code §1275 (West Supp. 1991).
8. See W. Attwater and J.Markle, Overview of California Water Rights and Water Quality Law,
19 Pac. L. J. 957 (1998).
9. Id.
10. Cal. Const art. XIV, §3 (West 1954).
11. See B.E. Gray, A Primeron California Water Transfer Law, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 745,763 (1989).
12. Attwater and Markle, supranote 8.
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communities overlying a common groundwater basin to organize themmanagement districts and thereby to regulate
selves into groundwater
13
withdrawals.
In California, appropriative rights are further subdivided into
those established prior to and after December, 1914, when the legislature
made the acquisition of all new appropriative rights subject to application
to and comprehensive regulation by a state administrative agency; state
government is generally viewed as having much broader discretionary
authority over the status of rights granted after 1914. Nonetheless, the California courts have recently held that even regarding 'pre-1914' rights, the
state water board still has primary jurisdiction to make findings and rulings on how reasonably and efficiently these surface waters are being
used.

14

The agency that enjoys such broad discretionary authority over
the assignment and regulation of surface water rights in California is the
SWRCB, a powerful regulatory commission whose members are
appointed to fixed terms by the governor, subject to the advice and consent of the state senate.15 All applications for a new water right, proposed
amendments to an existing one, or complaints against the holder of an
appropriative right are filed with the Water Rights Division of the
SWRCB. The Division's engineering staff does any investigatory work
incidental to a filing; any contested findings of the Division are resolved at
a hearing. This office oversees the status of more than 12,000 active permits, controlling to some degree the use of nearly all the surface water in
the state (except for riparians).
The other institutions responsible for Tier 1 distribution are the
courts. Findings and determinations of the SWRCB Water Rights Division
are subject to a final ruling by the Board, whose final actions are in turn
appealable to the California courts. In cases involving complaints of
alleged violation of permit conditions, plaintiffs may file either with the
Water Rights Division or initiate an action in superior court (i.e., state trial
court of general jurisdiction).16 In addition to hearing appeals from Board
action, state court also provides the forum of first resort for disputes
involving the exercise of riparian rights and groundwater withdrawals in
areas not subject to the primary jurisdiction of groundwater management
districts. 17 Depending on the specific issues raised, federal courts can
13. On the subject of groundwater management district organization, see Ostrum, supra
note 4, Chapter 4.
14. Imperial IrrigationDistrictv. State Water Resources Control Board, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160,
231 Cal. Rptr. 283 (4th Dist. 1986).
15. Cal. Water Code §175 (West 1971 & Supp. 1991).
16. Cal. Water Code §275 et seq.; Cal. Water Code §1050 et seq. (West 1971 & Supp. 1991).
17. See generally Cal. Water Code §100 et seq. (West Supp. 1991); and State Water Resources
Control Board, Information Pertaining to Water Rights in California (1990).
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exercise concurrent jurisdiction in cases involving the interpretation of
federal statutes or in which the United States is a party, although for a
variety of reasons the trend over the last decade has been one of deference
18
to primary action by the Board and review by the state judiciary.
Ultimately, then, it is the SWRCB and the courts that make all initial water distribution decisions and process the disputes arising from
those decisions. And as discussed above, it is the Water Rights Division
that initially handles permit complaints involving by far the greatest
quantity of surface water in that state, which is one of the reasons why the
Division's drought-related dispute processing
experience provides an
19
important source of data for this study.
Tier 2 Distributors
These are the organizations that obtain a water right from the
SWRCB for the purpose of impounding and delivering water to Tier 3 distributors. In terms of the sheer volume of water they convey to Tier 3, the
most important of these entities in California are the United States Bureau
of Reclamation's Central Valley Project (CVP), the California Department
of Water Resources' State Water Project (SWP), and the various facilities of
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), a huge
service district composed of approximately two dozen municipalities and
other local jurisdictions in the Los Angeles-San Diego area. Smaller in
scale but typical of many similarly situated regional water service agencies directly affected by the drought is the Santa Clara Valley Water District, at the southern end of the San Francisco Bay Region.
Although these institutions differ from each other considerably in
their particulars, they nevertheless share similarities that make them distinguishable as a group. First, they are all client-oriented agencies whose
principal statutory objective is to meet client demand-a demand which
across the state and over time has inexorably risen. This places them in the
position of vying against each other for ever-scarcer supplies of water
available at Tier 1, just as it also has made them each other's clients as well
as suppliers to Tier 3 (e.g., the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California is the State Water Project's largest single customer). Secondly,
the nature of the distributional transaction between Tier 1 and Tier 2 is
qualitatively different from that between Tier 2 and Tier 3. What all 12,000
holders of SWRCB permits in California received was a freely granted use
18. See R. E. Walston, Federal-StateRelations in California:From Conflict to Cooperation, 19 Pac.
L. J. 1299 (1988). More recently, however, the Supreme Court has reached the opposite conclusion regarding state water rights regulation at federally licensed hydropower facilities.
California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 110 S.Ct. 2024 (1990).
19. Another reason is the near-impossibility of surveying by cause of action all the suits
filed in each of the state's 58 trial court districts for the last five years (the period of the most
recent drought) to determine what percentage of these filings were water rights-related and
whether that percentage has changed appreciably.
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right, accessing the waters of the state in accordance with public interest
criteria established by the legislature. Once granted, the permit became a
valuable and legally defensible use interest (although recent caselaw and
statutory amendments have created considerable uncertainty over the
nature of that interest), for which the holder bore only the investigatory
costs of demonstrating the availability of unappropriated water and no
undue harm to other public and private interests sharing the same surface
water source. 20 In the view of many, the permit system is simply the mechanism by which the people of the State of California (with the exception of
the CVP) give themselves their own water.
However, while the relationship between Tier 1 and Tier 2 distributors is investigatory and adjudicatory, resulting in the assignment of a
valuable property interest, the relationship between Tier 2 and Tier 3 distributors is primarily contractual. Having acquired the right, Tier 2 distributors then sell the water for a valuable consideration to their Tier 3 clients.
The terms and conditions of these contracts are set through the articles of
government that created the Tier 2 distributors on the one hand, and by
the preferences and willingness to deal of the Tier 3 distributors on the
other. A quick review of the statutory origins of some of these institutions
can therefore provide insight into the nature of their relationships with
their customers.
The United States Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project
(BuRec) was created by act of Congress in 1935,21 in the midst of the Great
Depression and toward the end of one of the worst droughts in the documented history of the state. The CVP's original purpose was to impound
the waters of the Sacramento River near its headwaters, and construct
water diversion and delivery facilities throughout the arable portions of
the Central Valley for the stimulation and sustenance of family farm agriculture. To accomplish this, BuRec built facilities such as the dam and reservoir at the base of Mount Shasta near the Oregon border, and the DeltaMendota Canal, which transports the water the Sacramento River delivers
to the Delta southward up the San Joaquin Valley to the much more arid
farmlands located there.
There is now a considerable literature documenting (and criticizing) the CVP's transformation from a self-sustaining, family-farm-oriented public works project into a vast delivery system primarily servicing
the huge corporate farms of the Central Valley, selling them water at subsidized rates far below current market prices (while of course sup lying
the nation with a consistent abundance of food at reasonable cost). It is
within neither the scope nor the intent of this study to participate in that
20. Cal. Water Code §1200 et seq. (West Supp. 1991).
21. Pub. L. No. 75-32,50 Stat. 844,850 (1937).
22. Representative of such literature (and a work that cites much of the rest of it) is M.
Reisner's Cadillac Desert (1986).
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debate; suffice it to say that Tier 3 distributors have for most of the life of
the CVP managed to secure considerably more favorable delivery contract
terms than those served by other Tier 2 distributors, and with far fewer
restrictions than the authorizing legislation had originally contemplated. 23
But by the mid-twentieth century political leaders in California
had grown frustrated with what they saw as unreasonable restrictions on
future CVP development. Congress authorized the CVP to service only
farms, and not to support the explosive post-World War II growth of California's cities; and it was BuRec bureaucrats-not local farming interests-who would decide what lands were sufficiently arable to warrant
the delivery of CVP water. Furthermore, federal reclamation policy stipulated-at least in theory-that subsidized CVP water be distributed only
to small family farms, thus denying cheap federal water to the giant corporate landowners of the southern Central Valley.
To remedy this situation, in 1960 California voters supported a
referendum creating the state Department of Water Resources' State Water
Project (SWP), the two purposes of which were (1) to deliver water to
southern Central Valley farms that were too big and too arably marginal to
qualify for CVP water, and (2) to lift water thousands of feet up over the
Tehachapi Mountains at the southern end of the Central Valley, for delivery to the cities of southern California. 24 Development of the SWP was
begun immediately upon its authorization, and continues to this day; the
Department of Water Resources has signed long-term contracts with
MWD and others for the delivery
of more water than current SWP facili25
ties are capable of providing.
In effect, then, the CVP and SWP are 'top-down' Tier 2 distributors; they are managed by executive branch agencies (the federal Bureau
of Reclamation and the state Department of Water Resources, respectively), and any disputes with Tier 3 distributor-clients over contract terms
and conditions are subject first to internal administrative procedures
within these agencies and then ultimately to the courts, under principles
applicable to contract law.
But the same is not true of organizations such as the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California and the Santa Clara Valley Water
District. Although they received their public jurisdictional authority (e.g.,
the power to tax, spend, contract, condemn, sue and be sued) by virtue of
state legislation, these districts are actually the creation of compacts
among subordinate member jurisdictions. The MWD and SCVWD boards
23. Maass and Anderson, supra note 4, chapters 5 and 6.
24. See Bean, supra note 1.
25. The SWP's contractual obligations in excess of its present ability to deliver are discussed in Arthur Littleworth, The Public Trust vs. the Public Interest, 19 Pacific L. J. 1201, 1203

(1988).
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of directors are made up of representatives of the various municipal and
other jurisdictions who buy water from the district; these are basically
organizations of governments selling water to themselves.
For instance, the MWD was created in 1927 through negotiations
among several southern California communities, led by William Mulhol26
land of the ever-thirsty Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.
On its formation, MWD set about assuring its members a water supply
principally through the construction of an aqueduct to import water from
the Colorado River. Then upon voter approval of the State Water Project in
1960, MWD (which had lobbied hard for the project) signed long-term
contracts for the purchase of SWP water. The MWD sells water it imports
from the Colorado River, from the SWP, and from rights held by its constituent jurisdictions, to the 27 member agencies and 270 sub-agencies
within its service area; water distribution policies
and practices are set by
27
its constituent-composed board of directors.
Like the MWD, the Santa Clara Valley Water District is a group of
Tier 3 distributors banded together to share the formidable costs involved
in securing and defending water rights, constructing impoundment and
diversion facilities, and collectively managing their finite water resources.
Created at a time when the Santa Clara Valley was still liberally dotted
with orchards, vineyards, and vegetable fields, agriculture has since been
nearly eliminated from the area. Rapid intense urbanization in and
around San Jose and the aerospace-electronics industrialization of the
region in the latter half of the twentieth century gave birth to the state and
nation's micro-electronics industry and the area's new nickname: 'Silicone
Valley.'
Today the SCVWD's board and staff continue to manage their
aquifer for subsurface water storage, subsidence and intrusion control,
and flood control, although its principal activities and expenses are now
associated with procuring and delivering to28its member jurisdictions an
adequate supply of municipal-quality water.
Procedures for resolving disputes between 'bottom-up' Tier 2 distributors (like the MWD and SCVWD) and their Tier 3 member governments differ from those in the 'top-down' bureaucracies discussed above.
Unlike the classic contract disputes between Tier 3 customers and Tier 2
agencies like BuRec and DWR, which move from administrative review
into the courts (if unresolved), most problems arising between regional
Tier 2 special purpose districts and their Tier 3 constituent local governments are handled legislatively, by public debate and a vote of the district
26. See generally W. Kahrl, Water and Power (1982), for a description of the MWD's genesis.
27. Telephone interview with M. Puffer, Administrative Analyst, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Dec. 4, 1991.
28. Interview with J. H. Sutcliffe, Supervising Engineer, Santa Clara Valley Water District,
July 24,1991.
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board of directors. The effectiveness of these self-organized and self-governed Tier 2 distributors is in fact predicated on their ability to make and
keep the peace among their Tier 3 members; failure to do so ultimately
means the failure of the organization to achieve its purposes.
Tier 3 Distributors
For the most part, these are organizations of end-users: municipal
water companies, regional utility districts, private water companies, farmers organized into agricultural conservancy districts, and private agricultural water purveyors. Public entities among Tier 3 distributors adopt
distribution rules legislatively and enforce them administratively, while
privately held water companies in California are subject to business regulation by the California Public Utilities Commission. As depicted in Figure
1, most of the largest Tier 3 distributors (major cities, big agricultural conservancy districts) hold senior water rights assigned directly from Tier 1
distributors and buy water from Tier 2 distributors as well, when they can
and if the price is right. Disputes between end-users in Tier 3 jurisdictions
(i.e., between water users in the same city or farmers in the same conservancy district) over distribution rule compliance are resolved by complaint to the Tier 3 distributing authority; disputes between end-users and
the authority are first addressed legislatively, by appeal to the rule-making body (water commissioners, city council, district board of directors),
and-if not resolved-ultimately to the courts. Aggrieved private water
company customers complain to the state Public Utilities Commission.
Tier 3 distributors surveyed in this research were chosen specifically because they are in a region of the state that was seriously affected by
the drought, and in which institutions were compelled to make decisions
resulting in supply cutbacks to the end-users they serve. The hardest-hit
Tier 3 distributor in this survey (and among the most severely challenged
districts in the state) was the Marin County Municipal Utility District,
serving the affluent suburbs immediately north of San Francisco across
the Golden Gate (see Figure 2). The Marin District is among those jurisdictions along the California coast that had earlier declined to expand its
water supply at the same rate as its population growth, as an indirect
means of controlling urban expansion. During the 1976-77 drought, the
district had to build an emergency pipeline across the San Rafael Bridge to
temporarily tap into the scarce but available water supplies of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. When that drought ended the pipeline was
removed, and district voters later rejected a bond initiative to permanently augment its water supply, after heated debate between growth and
no-growth advocates.
An even more urbanized but less severely affected area was the
eastern side of the San Francisco Bay region encompassing most of Contra

I Sacramelato

WATER SERVICE JURISDICTIONS*
t Maria Municipal Water District
2. East Bay Municipal Utility District
3. San Francisco Water Department
4. Santa Clara Valley Water District
5, Monterey Peninsula Water Management District

FIGURE 2. Central Coastal California,
with Selected Water Service Jurisdictions
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Costa and Alameda Counties, including the cities of Oakland, Berkeley,
and the suburbs of the East Bay hills-all of which are served by the East
Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD). Although its service area is
larger than Marin's and it delivers water to a greater number of end-users,
EBMUD's customers were not called upon to make conservation sacrifices
as deep as Marin's, principally for three reasons: the capacity of EBMUD's
impoundment and diversion facilities, their location, and their degree of
interconnection with Tier 2 distributors.
East Bay voters created EBMUD in 1923; the District's principal
water supply comes from a dam and reservoir on the Mokulumne River in
the foothills of the Sierra Nevada Mountains across the Central Valley
from its service area, along with a pipeline to deliver its water to the East
Bay.29 By contrast, Marin relies entirely on smaller reservoirs located onsite in its coastal hills. When in dry years coastal areas receive little rain,
what moisture there is may be more likely to precipitate out as snowfall
over the Sierras, where Spring runoff is captured in the reservoirs of Tier 2
distributors like the CVP and SWP, or well-financed Tier 3 distributors
such as EBMUD. Smaller coastal districts like Marin must also have rainfall during a longer portion of the rainy season, since their reservoirs are
smaller and they have less potential for long-term storage. Lastly, the
older, larger districts like EBMUD that already have dams, reservoirs, and
pipelines in or near the Central Valley also have the ability to interconnect
their delivery systems with those of the CVP and SWP to facilitate water
exchanges among these organizations; Marin and many of the other
smaller coastal districts do not.
Whereas most Tier 3 distributors are set up simply to deliver
water to residential and industrial customers, the Monterey Peninsula
Water Management District was statutorily empowered as a comprehensive conjunctive use (i.e., surface and groundwater-coordinating) water
resource management authority.30 Voters on the peninsula (with the support of the state legislature) created the district in the aftermath of the
1976-77 drought, to attempt at the regional level what California government has so far been incapable of or unwilling to do statewide: engage in
the unified, coordinated, hydrologic management of a defined geographic
region to ensure that supply and demand are kept in balance, surface and
groundwater users do not damage each other by their withdrawals, and
current and future water resource management practices do not result in
further deterioration of the natural environment.

29. East Bay Municipal Utility District, All About EBMUD. Oakland, Calif. (1991).

30. Cal. Water Code Appendices 118-1-118-901.
31. Interview with D. Fuerst, Senior Hydrologist, Monterey Peninsula Water Management
District, Monterey, California, July 18,1991.
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Also unlike Marin and EBMUD, the Monterey Peninsula District
does not now own and operate diversion and distribution facilities.
Rather, it regulates the actions of those who do so. As a result, the
Monterey District represents something of an experiment in the regional
governance of municipal water resources. In regulating service conditions
of a private water company, it is performing some of the functions normally thought to reside with the state Public Utility Commission; and in
seeking to regulate water acquisition, surface management, and relations
among holders of appropriative water rights permits it is in some ways
emulating the decisionmaking of the State Water Resources Control
Board.
As is the case with most other public sector Tier 3 distributors, disputes over distribution policies and practices are brought to the Monterey
Peninsula District board of directors (composed of representatives of constituent governmental jurisdictions and private water companies) for legislative32resolution, if there is an appeal from an initial administrative
ruling.
Another somewhat unique jurisdiction surveyed in this study is
the San Francisco Water Department. The SFWD's water supply is
impounded at the Hetch-Hetchy Reservoir in Yosemite National Park, and
shipped by pipeline across the Central Valley. The Department acts as a
Tier 3 distributor in supplying water to end users in San Francisco; but it is
also a major Tier 2 distributor, in that it wholesales two thirds of its water
supply to Tier 3 providers on the lower San Francisco Peninsula and in the
East Bay (see Figure 2). 3
Collectively, these Tier 3 distributors in the San Francisco BayMonterey corridor, in combination with clients of the Santa Clara District
and southern California's Metropolitan Water District, provide municipal
and industrial water service to about three fourths of the state's population.
DISPUTING DISTRIBUTIONS IN TIMES OF DROUGHT
Characterizations of Disputing Behavior
Recounted below are the findings of field work and analysis conducted in the fifth year of the late 1980s California drought, when it was
unclear to all respondents whether the upcoming water year would bring
plentiful precipitation and a 'return to normalcy,' or a water emergencybecome-crisis that would fundamentally and permanently alter water pol32. Monterey Peninsula Water Management District, 1990 Annual Report.
33. Telephone interview with C. Davis, Manager, Customer Service Division, San Francisco Water Department, San Francisco, CA, Dec. 9, 1991.
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itics and water use practices throughout the state. Respondents in every
institution were visibly concerned, and expressed the view that whether
the drought ended with that water year or not, managing the resource in
the future would probably never be quite the same as it had been in the
past. The perceived inequities and insufficiencies in the existing statewide
distribution system had become too apparent, the conflicts too palpable,
and the means of their resolution (to some) too obvious.
The research question posed in examining the disputing behavior
of parties subject to allocation decisions at each distribution tier was
whether there had been a rise in the volume of disputes co-incident with
the occurrence of drought in California. The unit of measurement at each
tier was the filing of a formal complaint, either against the distributing
institution or against other parties subject to that institution's decisions.
Water Rights Complaints at the SWRCB
Figure 3 depicts the super-imposition of water rights disputing
activity (i.e., complaints filed) on water supply for the period encompassing the two latest droughts in California. The bar graph represents the
yield of the Sacramento River system (the Sacramento and its tributaries)
as reported by the California Department of Water Resources. 34 The line
graph illustrates the number of water rights complaints filed by holders of
appropriative water rights permits or other interested parties against
other appropriators before the Water Rights Division of the State Water
Resources Control Board.
What these two data sets reveal is a significant inverse relationship between the availability of water and the incidence of complaints.
The lowest flow in the recorded history of the river (1976-77) coincided
with the highest incidence of permit violation complaints ever filed with
the Board's Water Rights Division. (Because California's dry season occurs
toward the end of the water year, during summer and early fall, disputes
over water shortages filed with the Board usually appear in their fiscal
year records as having been filed after the end of the water year in which
the shortage occurred. Thus the highest complaint incidence experienced
by the Board--over 150 filings-is expressed in the line graph as occurring
during water years 1977-78, although these disputes35are actually based on
shortages occurring during water years 1976-1977.)
SWRCB Water Rights Division investigators tend to view these
complaints as falling into one of two broad categories, based on the issues
34. California Department of Water Resources, California's Continuing Drought 6, Figure 3
(1991).
35. Interview with Mark Stretars, Water Resources Control Engineer, Complaint Section,
Division of Water Rights, State Water Resources Control Board, Sacramento, CA, July 29,
1991.
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in dispute and the amounts of water in question.36 Since complaint record
keeping began (during the 1976-77 drought), the Board has been processing a baseline' of large-scale, long-term, policy-oriented disputes (several
of which have ripened into subsequent litigation) involving conflicts
between municipal/industrial water providers, agricultural conservancy
districts, and public interest organizations seeking preservation of environmental quality generally and wildlife habitat in particular. The most
serious and prolonged conflicts have focused on the impacts of the southward diversion of freshwater outflows from the Sacramento River system
which would otherwise flow westward through the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta and San Francisco Bay to the Pacific Ocean.
Conflicts over the environmental impacts of increased freshwater
diversions from their natural course pre-dated the drought of the late
1980s-early 1990s. After years of wrangling between environmental
groups and the city of Los Angeles, in 1983 the California Supreme Court
for the first time used the public trust doctrine as a basis for directing the
SWRCB to condition the exercise of existing water rights permits (as distinguished from rulings on new permit applications) on adherence to stan37
dards for the preservation of the integrity of the natural environment.
Three years later California's First District Court of Appeals compelled the SWRCB to use the public trust doctrine as well as state and federal water quality laws to condition the existing permits of all major water
rights holders on the Sacramento River system (including the Central Valley Project and State Water Project) on the maintenance of freshwater outflows westward through the Delta. 38 Research had demonstrated that
reduced freshwater flows had allowed saltwater intrusion into the Delta,
resulting in the degradation of fisheries, waterfowl habitat, and drinking
water quality in the region.
Since the record in this litigation showed that the southward
diversion of Sacramento River water was damaging the Delta ecosystem
even during abnormally wet years, it came as no surprise when researchers learned that these diversions in combination with the drought of the
late 1980's were having a profoundly more damaging effect on the area's
natural environmental quality than earlier non-drought studies had
shown. 39 As of this writing, issues involving Delta diversions and environmental quality being adjudicated before the SWRCB and the California
courts continue to comprise the most serious long-term water distribution
36. id.
37. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419,658 P.2d
709,189 Cal. Rptr 346, cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
38. U.S. v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161

(1986).
39. These severe drought-related impacts are documented and summarized in Gleick and
Nash, supranote 5.
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conflict in the state.40 Thus, the drought appears to be having the effect of
seriously exacerbating already existing conflicts over how water should
be distributed in the state and for what purposes.
More localized but nonetheless major (in terms of water quantities involved and damage sustained) disputes have also been occasioned
by the drought elsewhere in the state. Representative of these cases is an
action brought by Friends of the Mokulumne River against the East Bay
Municipal Utility District in response to a massive fish kill occurring at
one of EBMUD's two reservoirs in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada, when
inflows were insufficient to keep the water and dissolved oxygen4 1levels
high enough and temperatures low enough for the fish to survive.
However, Board investigat6rs ascribe at least half of the droughtassociated increase in complaint filings to what they call 'Mom and Pop'
inter-appropriator disputes, in which the only issue is whether an
upstream appropriator is improperly withholding and diverting more
water than the permit allows, and the amount of water in controversy is
usually less than a thousand acre-feet. 4 2 Investigators first noticed this
increase in 1986-87, and it rose steadily until 1990-91. What also rose was
the geographic location of the dispute. In 1986-87, most conflicts were
between appropriators at relatively low-lying areas of the Sierra Nevada
foothills. With each year of continued drought, complaints were filed by
appropriators higher and higher on each river or stream, until finally-in
the view of investigators-it became apparent to all appropriators on the
stream that shortages were being caused less by illegal upstream
impoundments and diversions than they were simply by the drought
itself.4 3
What rose as well was Water Rights Division response time to the
filing of complaints. Whereas in years of normal rainfall and complaint filings averaging no more than 50 per year, Water Rights staff could usually
investigate a complaint within 30-60 days and often have it resolved
within three months, by 1990 the staff was so backlogged with complaints
that it could seldom even acknowledge in writing the receipt of the complaint within 30 days, and couldn't expect to investigate it for about six
months. 44
Complainants had the option of filing an action for damages and
injunctive relief in Superior Court. But in those circumstances, the plaintiff
40. For a thorough description and analysis of this conflict, see R. Robie, The Delta Decisions: The Quiet Revolution in CaliforniaWater Rights, 19 Pac. L. J. 1111 (1988). Now a state trial
court judge, Mr. Robie is also former director of the state's Department of Water Resources,
and board member of the SWRCB.
41. EBMUD report, supra note 29.
42. Stretars interview, supranote 35.

43. Id.
44. Id.
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bore all the transaction costs of carrying the burden of proof of showing
that the upstream appropriator was guilty of unauthorized diversion, and
discovery would usually take at least six months anyway, with a trial date
set some time after that. In contrast, the state covers the cost of a SWRCB
Water Rights Division complaint investigation, even if that inquiry could
not be conducted until the end of the water year (by which time circumstances giving rise to the complaint had often changed).45
In summary, the incidence of water rights complaint filings with
the Water Rights Division of the SWRCB more than tripled (above normal
precipitation year filings) during the 1976-77 drought, and more than
doubled during drought years 1987-90. Division case backlogs and
response time went up sharply in reaction to these circumstances, as the
dispute-settling institutions of state government were stressed every bit as
much as the state's capacity for the physical distribution and delivery of
water. Furthermore, since most of the lawsuits include an appeal from
SWRCB rulings, the Board is a defendant in many of these actions, so staff
time and expertise is consumed in the defense of its actions at the same
time that it is attempting to resolve disputes among appropriators and
other adversarial interested parties.
The Experience of Tier 2 Distributors
Compared to formal disputing activity before the SWRCB,
respondents at Tier 2 allocating institutions reported a near-absence of formal disputes occasioned by their sometimes draconian drought response
decisions. For instance, in February of 1991 the State Water Project cut off
all water deliveries to its agricultural customers, 46 and up to 90 percent of
its deliveries to the cities served by southern California's giant Metropolitan Water District.47 Yet the legal staff at the state Department of Water
Resources, which manages the SWP, reported no suits or formal administrative complaints filed by contractors against the Department in response
to this action.48 To be sure, the SWP Contractors Association did engage in
prolonged negotiations with DWR directors in an attempt to mitigate the
impacts of this action, but no legal conflicts between contractors and DWR
had yet ensued by the end of 1991, nor were any anticipated.4 9
In normal-precipitation years, the Metropolitan Water District
obtains most of its water from the State Water Project, the Colorado River,
and via other water rights held by its member jurisdictions. In anticipation
of the February, 1991 cutback from the State Water Project, the MWD
45. Id.
46. R. Reinhold, Drought Forces Cutoff of Water to Vast Farmlandsin California, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 5, 1991, p. Al, col. 2.
47. Puffer interview, supra note 27.
48. Telephone interview with N. Hill, Staff Attorney, Office of Legal Counsel, California
Department of Water Resources, Sacramento, California, Dec. 4, 1991.

49. Id.
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Board adopted a contingency plan mandating 31 percent conservation
below pre-drought consumption levels for all of its member municipalities and other customers. 5 For every acre-foot of water conserved beyond
the 31 percent reduction, MWD rebated the jurisdiction $100, while for
every acre-foot short of the mandated conservation level, MWD fined the
customer $394. As a result, MWD achieved a system-wide conservation
level of 38 percent, due in part to conservation measures, but also to the
fact that many member jurisdictions began pumping the groundwater
from beneath their lands. Since they could pump groundwater for about
$130 per acre-foot but were having to pay MWD $240 for surface water,
they therefore made money on the MWD's rebate program, which had to
be curtailed as a result.5 1 No member jurisdiction has formally challenged
implementation of the District's mandatory conservation program. The
primary source of legal conflict at present is between the Board and one of
its members, the San Diego County Water Authority, over the construction
and operation2of interconnection facilities, and not over the distribution of
5
water per se.
The Santa Clara Valley Water District likewise reported no formal
disputes among its member water agencies or between members and the
District arising from the 25 percent conservation goal it mandated in
March of 1991; 53 the SCVWD actually achieved average conservation levels of nearly 32 percent among its member jurisdictions.5 4 Because District
revenue is based on the quantity of water sold, in 1991 it raised its wholesale water rates 50 percent to make up the shortfall; the rate hike was
passed along in varying degrees by all member agencies to their retail customers. 55 In response, the agencies were beginning to report considerable
consumer frustration, in that residential end-users voluntarily exceeded
the District's conservation goals only to see their water rates rise sharply
anyway. However, as of December, 1991, no formal challenges had been
issued against the District either by member agencies or retail customers
based upon mandatory conservation measures or the wholesale rate
56
increase.
The United States Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project
announced in February of 1991 that it was cutting delivery to CVP contractors by up to 75 percent, and its delivery to cities (a minor portion of
CVP diversions) by up to 50 percent. 57 Since the cuts went into effect (and
as of December, 1991), only two of the CVP's hundreds of contractors have
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Puffer interview, supranote 27.
Id.
Id.
Sutcliffe interview, supra note 28.
SCVWD, Santa Clara County Drought Status Report, May, 1991 (Executive Summary).
Sutcliffe interview, supra note 28.
Id.
Water Cut Again for Californians, N.Y. Tunes, February 15, 1991, p. D15, col. 6.
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filed suits naming the Bureau as a defendant. 58 One suit was brought by
the Central California Irrigation District against a neighboring groundwater extractor for using CVP facilities to export large quantities of
groundwater for sale outside the region; the case against the CVP as an
accessory in this suit was dismissed in November of 1991.9 The other suit
was brought by the Glen-Colusa Irrigation District for the CVP's failure to
recognize unexercised storage rights the District claimed it had in one of
the Project's tributary reservoirs. As of the end of 1991, this suit was still in
the midst of pre-trial motions and discovery had not yet commenced.60
Given the millions of acre-feet of water entailed in these Tier 2
allocation cutbacks, the relative lack of formal disputing activity experienced by distributors at this level is noteworthy, especially in contrast to
the incidence of complaints either before or against the SWRCB at Tier 1.
As the data discussed below will show, this was very much the experience
of Tier 3 distributors surveyed in this research as well.
Conservation Cutbacks and Conflict
Among Selected Tier 3 Distributors
While the Tier 3 distributors surveyed in this research may not be
broadly representative of the twelve thousand appropriative water rights
permit holders in California, they do collectively provide the municipal
water supply for about three fourths of the population of the state. Also,
the similarities in their experience in the formulation and implementation
of stringent conservation measures are significant enough to warrant careful attention. They were also among the service areas most directly
affected by the recent drought.
Among the most severely affected of the jurisdictions surveyed
was the Marin Municipal Water District. In the fifth year of the drought
and with reservoirs down to 30 percent of capacity, in March of 1991 the
District required its customers to cut water use by 50 percent from existing
consumption, to 50 gallons per person per day (compared to the traditional 4-person household/acre foot per year standard, which equals 223
gallons per person per day).61 Rains later in the season alleviated the situation somewhat; by December of 1991 the District was back to 25 percent
conservation, but customers were voluntarily achieving 35 percent on
average and6245 percent conservation in certain portions of the District's
service area.

58. Telephone interview with M. de Haas, Chief, Repayment and Contracts Division, U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, Pacific Southwest Region, Sacramento, California, Dec. 5, 1991.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Marin Municipal Water District, 2(1) On the Waterfront 1 (Winter, 1991).
62. Telephone interview with L. Pischel, Senior Public Information Representative, Marin
Municipal Water District, Corte Madera, California, Dec. 6, 1991.
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As of December, 1991, no administrative or judicial challenges to
the District's severe conservation measures had been mounted. This may
be partially due to the active and direct involvement of MMWD customers in water supply policymaking. In November of 1991 they voted on a
bond measure proposed to fund an $80 million dollar interconnection
project with Sonoma County's Russian River to the north-a plan which
had been strongly opposed in the past because of residents' concerns that
a greatly expanded water supply capacity would lead to intensive urban
development of the county's remaining open space. 63 But by November
reservoirs were back up to 70 percent of capacity (the District's capacity is
somewhat limited relative to demand), and with voter fears of urban
development evidently continuing to outweigh the exigencies imposed on
their lifestyles by the drought, they voted by a 54-46 percent margin to
reject the bond measure. 64 The only other plan the District is now contemplating for supply augmentation is a desalination plant, which would cost
approximately $1,800 per acre-foot of water to build and operate. 65 This is
more than 10 times the purchase price of water from the State Water
Project, which is unavailable to the Marin District anyway, due to the voters' disinclination to interconnect with other service areas.
The East Bay Municipal Utility District board of directors adopted
differential conservation requirements in the spring of 1991, calling for 32
percent conservation among residential customers (the largest user
group), nine percent conservation for industrial users and 17 percent for
commercial (the East Bay shoreline, including the city of Oakland, its
docks, and airport, is heavily industrialized), and 50 percent conservation
for irrigators (e.g., golf courses, parks, and cemeteries). As in Marin, residential conservation on average exceeded the standard set.66 Like Marin,
EBMUD also adopted inverted block rate structuring, in which the more
water a customer used, the more sharply the rates for that water use went
up.
Due to the climatic and geographic peculiarities of the San Francisco Bay region, the EBMUD service area actually encompasses two distinct climate zones: the cool, summer fog-shrouded East Bay shoreline,
where Berkeley and Oakland are located, and the much warmer and drier
suburban areas east of the East Bay Hills (which are also not nearly as
densely populated as the Berkeley-Oakland corridor). In 1989 and again
in 1991 an irate citizens' group brought suit against EBMUD, charging
that uniform service-area-wide conservation measures and-more signif63. Interview with R. Thiesen, Principal Engineer, Marin Municipal Water District, Corte
Madera, California, Aug. 7, 1991.
64. Pischel interview, supra note 62.

65. Thiesen interview, supranote 63.
66. Interview with I. McClendon, Public Information Representative, East Bay Municipal
Utility District, Oakland, California, Aug. 2, 1991.
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icantly -the inverted block rate structure were imposing an inequitable
burden, in that in addition to a warmer climate, many of the large, expensive homes in the area were surrounded by orchards and other extensive,
water dependent landscaping. 67 The 1989 suit, brought only by customers, was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The 1991 suit was
also joined by the wealthy warm-weather suburbs of Orinda, Lafayette,
and San Ramon; they charged that the inverted block rate stretched across
two climate zones amounted to an indirect surtax, in violation the state's
tax limitation initiative. 68 At the end of 1991, the case was still at the pretrial motion stage.
The Monterey Peninsula Water Management District regulates
the provision of water to all users in the area; it is also in the planning
stages of developing its own storage and delivery facilities. By the end of
1990 the relatively limited existing storage reservoirs owned by public
and private water companies in the District were down to 50 percent of
capacity; the MPWMD had been mandating twenty percent residential
conservation since 1989. Like other municipal service areas surveyed in
this research, Monterey Peninsula residents voluntarily exceeded this
goal, achieving 31 percent conservation in 1990.69 An unusually wet
March in 1991 restored reservoirs to almost 100 percent of capacity; but
since storage is so limited relative to demand, another year of drought
could put the District back on mandatory conservation once again. 70
There have been no legal assaults on the District's water rationing
plan since the onset of the drought. The most celebrated legal attack on the
Board's authority to restrict water use occurred before the drought, when
actor and Carmel tavern owner Clint Eastwood challenged the Board's
denial of new water service for the development of his real estate; the
Board's action was eventually upheld.71
After suspending its moratorium for a period pending more
detailed studies of area hydrology and demand, the Board reinstated it in
1990, upon a finding that regional demand was consistently at or in excess
of dependable supply; 72 severe new use limitations of some kind will
probably continue to be imposed by the Board until additional supplies
are developed. MPWMD long-term plans for supply augmentation
include a dam and reservoir adjacent to the Ventana Wilderness in the Los
Padres National Forest (at the northern end73 of the Big Sur region), and a
3,000 acre-foot-per-year desalination plant.
67. Telephone interview with R. Maddows, General Counsel, EBMUD, Oakland, California, Aug. 5, 1991.
68. Id.
69. 1990 Annual Report, supra note 30, at 20.
70. Fuerst interview, supra note 31.
71. Id.
72. Annual Report, supranote 30, at 2.
73. Id. at 10.
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Although the MPWMD's drought-related actions have not been
challenged, water appropriators within the District are in dispute with
each other. Since most of the District's water is supplied by the private
Cal-American Water Company, when its reservoir on the Carmel River
was drawn down during the drought the company sank several large
wells in the flood plain below its dam to augment supply. Downstream
users complained to the Water Rights Division of the State Water
Resources Control Board that the groundwater that Cal-Am was extracting was tributary to their surface water flows. Given the complaint backlog at the SWRCB, however, its investigators have urged74the MPWMD to
seek a mediated settlement among the disputing parties.
INTERPRETATIONS OF DISPUTING BEHAVIOR
Conflicting Conceptual Perspectives on Tier I Disputes
In his landmark essay portraying rational self-maximizers sharing a commonly held resource as collectively creating 'the tragedy of the
commons,' Garrett Hardin 75 described a resource management situation
in which, to quote Aristotle, "what is common to all has the least care
bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the
common interest." 76 In her 1990 book, Governing the Commons, Elinor
Ostrom more crisply defined a common pool resource as "a natural or
man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly
(but not impossible' to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use."" The resource system must be subject to diminution in
quantity by individual appropriations, thus making the actions and status
of co-appropriators interdependent. 78 Key to the study of these situations,
she says, is recognition of "the free rider problem. Whenever one person
cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person is
motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts
79
of others."
This article is about the role of conflict in the distribution of common pool resources at times when the supply of that resource is in decline.
To interpret disputing behavior before the Water Rights Division of the
SWRCB from the theoretical perspective of the literature on the governance of common pool resources, the first task is to address the question of
whether the surface waters of California subject to SWRCB jurisdiction (or
of any state government agency administering the prior appropriation
system) do indeed collectively compose a common pool resource. There
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Fuerst interview, supranote 31.
G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
Politics, Book II, chapter 3; quoted in Ostrom, supranote 4, at 2.
Id,at 30.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 6.
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are sharply conflicting schools of thought on this issue, the debate
between which goes to the very heart of the jurisprudence of water rights
on the theoretical side; the debate plays just as central a role in understanding the intense legal and political conflict between competing water
users in California and elsewhere in the arid West on the policy side.
A useful framework for quickly reviewing the jurisprudential dialogue is provided by the comparativist legal scholar Henry Ehrmann, 80 in
his summary and synthesis of the work of theorists such as Max Weber,
John Dewey, and Wolfgang Friedmann. 81 In discussing the ends of law, he
has pointed out that societies with formal legal systems use them to
achieve the ends of utility (law as an instrument to achieve a substantive
public purpose), security (the protection of settled expectations, especially
regarding the integrity of persons and property), and justice (interalia, the
resolution of utility-security conflicts by the use of means and the achievement of outcomes that conform to the prevailing norms and values of the
society in question). In describing the dynamic among these ends of the
law, Ehrmann concludes:
If the triad of justice, utility, and security describes adequately the near-universal ends of law, it also must be
understood that the relationship among the three values of law is relative and may give rise to considerable
tensions. How they will be resolved or mitigated, how
far utility should prevail over justice, or 8security
over
2
utility, each political system must decide.
From the standpoint of one school of water rights jurisprudenceone which strongly embraces the security ends of the law-the surface
waters of a prior appropriation state are not a commons at all. Based on
this line of analysis, water in a prior appropriation state at the time it first
adopted the prior appropriation doctrine should be loosely analogized to
public land at the time of the state's founding-land which was given
away to citizens under policies such as the Homestead Act in order to
achieve the public policy objective of maximizing the investment of private wealth and labor in land to produce economic benefit. Just as this
once-public land is now held as private property, the argument runs, so
should appropriative water rights be considered a like form of property;
the many state and federal judicial decisions discovering a compensable
property interest in83water are cited as support for the "water as private
property" position.
80. Henry Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures (1976).
81. Id. at 34-35; sources cited therein.
82. Id. at 35.
83. For a dogged defense of this perspective and a lamentation over its twentieth century
decline, see C. Schultz and G. Weber, ChangingJudicialAttitudes Towards PropertyRights in California Water: From Vested Rights to UtilitarianReallocations, 19 Pac. L. J. 1031 (1988).
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From this perspective, the appropriated surface waters of a prior
appropriation state should be collectively viewed as little more than an
assemblage of contiguous private rights; and the disputing behavior
before California's SWRCB is properly seen as similar to private land
owners engaged in boundary disputes-patrolling their borders to maindivided by prior
tain fences and fend off squatters. The commons has been
84
appropriation and riparian rights, and no longer exists.
In response, proponents of the opposing instrumentalist or utilitarian school are quick to assert that twentieth century developments in
water law and policy have rendered this analogy seriously imperfect in all
situations, and wholly inapplicable in many. First, the amended constitutions of most prior appropriation states declare the surface waters of the
state to be either the property of the state itself, or of the people of the state
collectively, and held in trust for them by the state. What an appropriator
therefore obtains from the state is not a fee simple private property right,
but rather a use right, or 'usufruct,' which the state defines in terms of
both the specific uses to which the water can be devoted and the means of
that use. 85 And second (to the relief of environmentally oriented instrumentalists) the courts in California and some other western states have
begun to hold that under the public trust doctrine, in granting, conditioning, and construing appropriative rights the state is compelled to take into
of the natural environment for aesthetic
consideration the preservation
86
purposes.
recreational
and
In 1928 California voters adopted a constitutional amendment
requiring that all appropriative and riparian water rights holders make
reasonable use of their waters, unreasonable use thereby becoming
grounds for revocation of the right.87 Further, the water must be used beneficially, which the law defines as municipal and domestic, agricultural,
and industrial (in that order). Appropriated water used in ways not
deemed beneficial under state law will also result in revocation of the
right, with no compensation due. Instrumentalists point out that there is
no parallel in land use law under which a property owner may lose title to
84. For a multi-faceted explication of this perspective, see T. Anderson, Ed., Water
Rights-Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, And The Environment (1983), especially

Mr. Anderson's introduction and A. Cuzan's chapter, Appropriators versus Expropriators:
The Political Economy of Water in the West, id. at 13.
85. Usufructory rights in prior appropriation states are discussed generally in W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws In The Nineteen Western States (1974). More recent discussions of the
evolutionary tensions between utility and security-oriented conceptions of western water
law may be found in C. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 317
(1985); S. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprintfor Change, 61 Or. L. Rev. 483 (1982);
and A. Dan Tarlock, Appropriationfor Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progess Report on "New"
Public Western Water Rights, 1978 Utah L. Rev. 211 (1978).
86. See, for instance, Harrison Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law:
Discordor Harmony? 30 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 17 (1985).
87. Cal. Const. art. X, §2.
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his or her land simply for not using it efficiently or not devoting it to a
state-defined beneficial purpose.
The California courts have interpreted the 1928 amendment as
conditioning the rights of riparians, 88 as requiring instream flows to maintain water quality and wildlife habitat in the Sacramento-San Joaquin
River Delta, 9 and as compelling the efficient use of water in irrigated
agriculture. 90 The legislature has also determined the preservation of fish,
wildlife, and recreational opportunity to be beneficial uses of water;91 and
in 1983 the California Supreme Court ordered the SWRCB to exercise its
public trust responsibility to preserve the natural environment, in conditioning permits already held by the City of Los Angeles
on the creeks
92
flowing into Mono Lake, east of the Sierra Nevadas.
Although the courts in California and elsewhere certainly do continue to recognize some measure of a valuable use interest in water, defensible under the due process and equal protection provisions of federal and
state constitutions, 93 that interest appears to have progressively less
resemblance to a classic real property right than advocates of the security
perspective would like to acknowledge. Under modem usufructory principles, an appropriative water right seems to be less a solid perimeter than
it is a semi-permeable membrane.
In addition to the growing influence of the public interest prerogative in the conditioning of water rights, another reason for concluding
that California's surface waters resemble a commons more than an assemblage of contiguous private rights concerns the excludability criterion. As
discussed earlier, one hallmark characteristic of the commons dilemma is
that resource users do not have the ability to exclude newcomers from
access to the resource. On first examination, it appears that such access
cannot be gained, since most of California's available surface water is fully
appropriated; and permit holders diligently guard their rights against any
attempted intrusions.
But just as appropriators have been unable to exclude from access
to the statewide water commons the emerging requirements of instream
flow standards to preserve environmental values, so too have they proved
incapable of controlling growing human demands for water. It may be
argued (as does the 'security' school of water rights jurisprudence) that
since the cities have already acquired water rights, and since the size of the
water rights 'pie' is already fixed (unless major new storage facilities are
constructed), additional access is not possible, as there is no more water to
88. Joslin v. Matin Municipal Water District, 67 Cal. 2d 132,60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
89. U.S. v. SWRCB, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986).
90. Imperial Irr Dist. v. SWRCB, 321 Cal. Rptr. 283 (4th Dist. 1986).
91. Cal. Water Code §1257.
92. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 89 Cal. Rptr.
346(1983).
93. Schulz and Weber, supranote 83.
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distribute and what there is has already been allocated. Advocates of the
free marketability of water would simply allow agricultural interests to
sell their water to expanding municipalities for whatever price the market
will bear,94 just as the finite supply of land in California (and elsewhere in
the West) is steadily being converted from agricultural to urban use.
However, the situation is not quite that simple. While municipal
consumption still accounts for less than 15 percent of California's developed water supply use (agriculture uses about 85 percent), that demand is
growing at an astonishing pace. Between droughts in the 1980s, the state's
population expanded at two and a half times the national average; in
addition to a higher than average birthrate, in 1990 alone 32,000 people a
month moved to California. 95 In 1987 demographers predicted that California's population would reach 36 million by the year 2010; in 1991 they
estimated instead a population that size by 2000.96
Municipal demand growth that rapid will mean an unrelenting
demand for as much-or more-water than the state is now capable of
providing. Either more storage and diversion facilities must be built (with
their attendant environmental consequences), more water must be
diverted from other uses (principally agriculture), or urban Californians
will have to learn to get by with far less water than they do today. Whatever path is chosen, there will be net losses to the state: further environmental degradation, a decline in food production capability, or a
significant downturn in water-related aspects of the region's traditional
quality of life. The uncontrolled addition of more and more people to California's population base is straining every component of the state's social
and physical infrastructure, 97 but perhaps most critically its ability to supply water. Given its population growth rate, California would have
reached this crossroads anyway; the drought only hastened the inevitable.
It should hardly seem surprising, then, that some of the coastal
communities most severely affected by the 1980s-90s drought-those
with limited storage capacity and no interconnections with statewide systems, such as Marin and Monterey-have begun refusing to make water
available to newcomers. At the statewide Tier 1 level, California is indeed
a water commons in crisis.
Interpreting the Tier 2 and 3 Experience
Given the intense levels of conflict at Tier 1, one might expect similar competitive friction at the lower distribution tiers as well. But in fact,
just the opposite seems to have occurred. Table 1 is a data table depicting
the conservation experience of the Tier 2 and 3 municipal distributors sur94. Anderson, supra note 84.

95. Vogel, Is CaliforniaBursting at the Seams? Calif. J., July, 1991, p. 295, 296.
96. Id. at 296.
97. Reinhold, In California, New Discussion on Whether to Bar the Door, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3,
1991, p. 1, col. 6.
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TABLE 1. Surface Water Conservation Experiences
of Tier 2 and 3 Municipal Distributors

Jurisdiction

A. Conservation
Requesteda

B. Conservation
Achieveda

C. Voluntary
Additional
Conservationb

1. East Bay Municipal
Utility District

15%

25%

67%

2. Marin Municipal
Water District

25%

35%

40%

3. Metropolitan Water
District of Southern
California

31%

38%

23%

4. Monterey
Peninsula Water
Management
District

20%

31%

55%

5. San Francisco
Water Department

25%

33%

32%

6. Santa Clara Valley
Water District

25%

32%

28%

Average Voluntary
Additional
Conservation

41%

a. Reduction in 1991 consumption below base year consumption (1986-87 in most cases).
b. Remainder of B minus A, as a percentage of A.
(Date sources cited in text of report)

veyed in this study, which collectively serve about three fourths of the
state's population. Column A lists the levels of water conservation
requested of end-users in 1991, relative to their pre-conservation consumption rates in 1987. Column B lists the actual conservation rates
achieved by end-users in each jurisdiction, and Column C shows the percentage by which users voluntarily conserved more water than requested
by their distributors.
What Table 1 shows is that during the fifth year of drought,
coastal Californians voluntarily achieved forty percent higher conservation levels than their providers had requested-a sacrifice that stands in
stark contrast to the relentless conflict occurring at Tier 1. To be sure, these
numbers mask some risky water management practices: member jurisdictions in the MWD reached their surface water conservation goals largely
by pumping finite groundwater supplies instead. The pumpers are gambling that precipitation will soon return to normal and the aquifers can be
recharged. If instead the drought continues and groundwater extractions
deeply overdraft the aquifers, these cities risk massive saltwater intrusion
into and the permanent compaction of their groundwater basins, thus
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ruining the subsurface water commons. It took decades of litigation and
the forging of complex inter-jurisdictional agreements to preserve southern California's groundwater basins in the latter half of the twentieth century;98 the temptation to sacrifice these years of cooperative conservation
effort for short-term expediency's sake presents a serious dilemma for the
MWD and its members.
Nonetheless, these voluntary conservation figures still reflect a
capacity for mutual forbearance and collective self-sacrifice that belies the
99
prevailing media image of Californians as self-indulgent exploiters.
Moreover, it flies in the face of the grim admonitions of analysts such as
Mancur Olson, who warned that
unless the number of individuals is quite small, or
unless there is coercion or some other special device to
make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will
100 not act to achieve
their common or group interests.
Every Tier 3 provider surveyed had the authority to impose punitive fines, install flow restrictors on the water lines of recalcitrant wastrels,
put utility liens on deadbeat property owners, and ultimately to discontinue water service to conservation program violators. Yet in five years of
drought, none of them has had to impose physical restrictions on end-user
consumption, and the number of lesser enforcement actions has remained
low. Some other dynamic must be at work to achieve the remarkable success of Tier 3 conservation programs.
This research has led me to conclude that the publicly owned Tier
2 and 3 water management districts undertaking these conservation measures represent examples of several successful self-organized, self-governing commons, as distinguished from the unstable, destructive, and
conflictual commons dilemma occurring at Tier 1. They all reflect the characteristics of successful common pool resource systems identified in
Ostrom's extensive comparative study: (1) defined commons boundaries,
(2) congruence between distribution rules and supply flow, (3) public participation in rule formulation and implementation, (4) adequate compliance monitoring, (5) graduated sanctions, (6) dispute resolution
mechanisms, and (7) the capacity for self-organization. 01 The self-organized Tier 2 and Tier 3 distributors all exhibit these features, they all
imposed deep reductions in consumption on their constituent end-users,
and they all managed to induce surprisingly high levels of cooperative
support for their demand reduction programs. The remainder of this arti98. See Ostrom, supra note 4, Chapter 4.
99. See, for example, Special Issue--Calfornia:The Endangered Dream, Tme, November 18,
1991.
100. M. Olson, The Logic Of Collective Action (1965); quoted in Ostrom, supra note 4, at 6.
101. Ostrom, supranote 4, at 90.
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cle explores ways in which some of the keys to the success of Tier 2 and 3
shrinking commons distributions might be applied to the far more troubled situation at Tier 1. Also examined are some Tier 2 and 3 management
practices reported to be now engendering some conflict, accompanied by
policy recommendations for maintaining end-users' cooperative behavior.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Voluntary Conservation and Water Pricing at Tiers 2 and 3
As discussed above, one of the most precious--and largely unrecognized-resources discovered in this research was the cooperative spirit
and good will of municipal water users, who on average achieved conservation 40 percent higher than their system managers had requested. But in
keeping with the public administration maxim that 'No good deed goes
unpunished,' their reward for this collective self-sacrifice in most jurisdictions was a steep increase in retail water rates, because service district revenues are directly tied to consumption levels. A water service district's
only marketable product has been its water; when less water was sold,
they charge more for it to maintain revenues.
This sent exactly the wrong message to municipal end users.
Inverted block rate structuring was the price incentive most districts used
for encouraging conservation, so consumers came to associate price with
good behavior. When districts raised rates anyway, consumers were left
with the sense that there are no rewards to be gained through self-sacrificing behavior.
Among the dozens of municipal consumers with whom I spoke
during the conduct of this field work, what repeatedly arose among them
was a pervasive sense confusion, frustration, and concern. Most residential water users have realized few discernible benefits from their collective
sacrifice, and have been told to expect even less water and higher prices in
the future if the drought continues. Many of them are now worried that
their voluntary conservation efforts will simply be taken for granted by
their water providers, and that current consumption levels will be used as
a base figure for computing even deeper cutbacks in the future. Overall, I
was left with the impression that municipal water providers are rapidly
expending one of their most valuable assets: the good will and collective
forbearance of their constituents.
Since it is likely that intermittent water shortages may become a
way of life in California (and elsewhere in the developing arid West, if global warming modelers are proven correct), what this situation calls for
immediately is a fundamental restructuring of water service rate-making
policy. At present, water district revenues and capital improvement bond
ratings are directly linked to consumption. There is in this situation an
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instructive parallel to electric utility regulation in the 1960s, when the
industry's cartoon salesman Reddy Kilowatt was constantly urging us to
consume more electricity. The economic viability of electrical utilities was
closely tied to high levels of consumption by consumers.
But the electric utilities, their regulators, and their customers were
taught a painful and expensive lesson throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as
nuclear power plant cost over-runs spiraled skyward and clean air
requirements compelled the refitting of fossil fuel burning generators. The
lesson was that by far the most cost-effective investment in 'new' energy
sources was conservation. Accordingly, by the late 1980s several progressive state public utility commissions were allowing (sometimes urging)
electric energy providers to build energy conservation measures into their
rate base. 102 Regulated companies were given the incentive to transform
themselves from simple energy retailers into energy use managers, and
consumers were provided with a variety of economic incentives as well as
technical devices for energy.conservation.
Most of the Tier 3 distributors'surveyed also offer low-cost water
saving devices to customers, such as low-flow showerheads; some also
offer rebates on low-flush toilets and drought resistant landscaping. But
the revenues of all these water distributors are still consumption-based. If
instead the Tier 3 distributors operated under an incentive system which
rewarded distributorconservation instead of the never-ending pursuit of
additional supplies, they could go a long way toward meeting future
water demand without having to rely so heavily on either new storage
construction or agricultural water buy-outs.
What this would require, though, is a radical change in thinking
among many municipal water bureaucrats. Los Angeles' aggressive water
provider William Mulholland may be gone, but his ghost still has a seat at
the boardroom table of every publicly owned water district in the arid
West. No water system bureaucrat wants to be in office on the day a voting
customer turns on the tap and nothing happens.
In fact, the very success of their water conservation programs may
prove to be politically problematic for Tier 2 and 3 distributors. Every year
they lobby the legislature to approve either changes in the water law or
new water projects or both, citing ever-growing demand for water supplies among their urban populations and commercial enterprises. But
suddenly their customers have demonstrated the ability to voluntarily get
by on considerably less water than they were before.
102. See G. Blackmon, ConservationIncentives: Evaluating the Washington State Experience,
127 Pub. Util. Fortnightly 24 (1991); A New Basisfor Conservation Programsfor the Poor:Expanding the Concept of "Avoided Cost," 21 Clearinghouse Rev. 135 (1989); and R. Colton, Conservation, Cost-Containmentand Full Energy Service Corporations:Iowa's New Definitionof "Reasonably
Adequate Utility Service," 34 Drake L. Rev. (1985).
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The municipal water bureaucracy faces a significant leadership
challenge. The temptation is probably quite strong at this juncture to scare
voters into demanding new water projects, regardless of the financial or
environmental costs (especially if the costs are broadly distributed and the
environmental destruction is at some remove). And advocating conservation instead of aggressively seeking out new water supplies creates the
reverse of the free rider problem: unless all major Tier 3 distributors agree
to invest heavily in conservation instead of acquisition, those who do so
may lose out on access to new long-term supplies.
In summary, Tier 3 distributors must find new and better ways to
reward constituent conservation sacrifices-something they will find difficult to do unless the distribution system itself has effective incentives to
conserve instead of consume. If they do not, the precious yet eminently
exhaustible sense of collective self-sacrifice among their constituents may
well be lost. And like salt water intrusion into an overdrafted coastal aquifer, the political mood that replaces that cooperative spirit will have an
unpleasant flavor indeed.
Reforming the Commons at Tier 1
The policy logjam that has beset water management in California
since the 1976-77 drought presents a formidable challenge to the political
leadership of the state. Since the winter of 1991 a water policy 'summit
conference' of municipal water providers, Central Valley agricultural
interests, and environmental advocates has been in session, trying to fashion a new consensus-based water policy. If they can come to agreement,
Governor Wilson has already announced that he will sponsor the product
as his personal proposal to the legislature. 103 As of the end of 1991, the
joint statements issued by this activity-informally known as the 'threeway process'-are brief and general, presumably because the negotiators
10 4
had not yet discovered a great deal of common ground.
If they are to succeed, they might be well-advised to focus on the
seven criteria for successful common pool resource management enumerated earlier. The concluding recommendations below are framed within
that context.
Regarding the existence of effective dispute resolution mechanisms and adequate compliance monitoring, some attention should be
paid to the heavy workload surge that befalls the Water Rights Division of
the SWRCB in times of shortage. One means of making the Complaint Section of the Division more efficient might be to partially decentralize it.
103. Interview with R. Potter, deputy director, California Department of Water Resources,
Sacramento, CA, July 29,1991.
104. E.g., letter from Three-Way Water Agreement Process Steering Committee to Governor Pete Wilson, July 23,1991, and appended documents.
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Now, all complaints are received in the Sacramento office; investigators
have to travel throughout the state, familiarizing themselves with each
new situation. Since the state is already divided up into several hydrologic
regions for the purpose of water quality control regulation, an innovation
worth trying might be to station a few investigators in each region. They
could then become thoroughly acquainted with that region, would not
have to travel as extensively as they do now, and could perhaps be trained
to engage in more pro-active dispute intervention. Consistency in rule
application would not be forsaken if investigator recommendations were
subject to the approval of a Sacramento-based supervisor, as they usually
are now anyway. The only significant new problem this might create is the
possibility of regional investigator 'capture' by powerful local water interests; but other bureaucracies have managed to overcome this difficulty.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it is a lack of congruence
between distribution rules and supply flow that is creating an increasingly
dysfunctional and destructive commons at Tier 1 of the distribution system. Like other western states, California is laboring under water rights
and reclamation policy distribution rules adopted at a time when the economic and social organization of the United States-and the resulting
needs of its population-were radically different from what they are
today. Among the most serious of these distribution rule incongruities are
the environmental destruction occasioned by water management during
the drought, completely discontinuous water pricing practices between
agricultural and municipal water users, and equally striking differences
between agricultural and urban consumers regarding the efficiency of
water use.
These three issues are hardly newcomers to the western water
policy agenda. They have been intensely debated in Congress, state legislatures, and dozens of books and periodicals for at least the last 20 years,
when the National Water Commission focused public attention on them in
its 1973 report. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to recount the
debate over these issues or even summarize all the relevant literature;
these topics are in large part what the future of the West is all about. However, the extraordinary circumstances created by prolonged drought in
combination with steadily growing water demands in California have cast
the debate over environmental degradation, agricultural/urban water
pricing, and agricultural/urban use efficiency into fresh and vivid relief.
A brief review of California's drought-related confrontation of these
issues will demonstrate the challenges facing water policy negotiators in
that state, as they attempt to reform the statewide water commons; and it
also provides a cogent fast-forward illustration of what the future may
hold in store for other allocating institutions in the West, if shortages are
not anticipated and pro-actively planned for in the present.
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Turning first to the question of environmental deterioration, it
was noted earlier in this paper that many observers believed California's
aquatic environment to be in steep decline even before the drought. The
successful suit against the city of Los Angeles by the Audubon Society,
mandating public trust environmental protections in the regulation of
tributaries to Mono Lake was decided in 1983, and judicially ordered
instream flows through the Delta in 1986 both occurred in the early 1980s,
in recognition that even in the best of times these aquatic habitats were not
being adequately protected under existing prior appropriation and reclamation policy doctrines; the drought simply made matters much worse.
Since California is not among those states which allow instream appropriations for environmental protection, 105 the instream flow standards the
SWRCB mandates as a condition for maintaining a water rights permit are
proportional rather than absolute, making aquatic habitats more vulnerable to drought-related devastation than states which recognize instream
appropriations.
Furthermore, the emergency provisions of the California statute
under which short-term water transfers from agricultural to urban use
have been accomplished over the last three years allow for exemption
from environmental review. This emergency waiver of the environmental
assessment of water transfer impacts has been exercised annually for three
consecutive years, which in the eyes of some is beginning to amount to a
de facto policy of ignoring environmental quality in times of drought. In
1991, groundwater basins were also in overdraft throughout central and
southern California, jeopardizing especially the vulnerable coastal aquifers.
In recognition of the principles of successful commons governance, water policy negotiators in California and other states confronting
similar problems may wish to devote renewed attention to the concept of
regional conjunctive use regulation and management (i.e., region-defined
integrated surface and groundwater management). This would amount to
doing statewide on a region-by-region basis what the Monterey Peninsula
Water Management District has been working on since 1977: the adoption
and enforcement of a regional water budget to balance supply and
demand, halt environmental degradation, and more thoroughly integrate
surface and groundwater use decisions. Popularly elected regional governing boards or board members appointed by local political leaders
would also address the criteria of public participation in rule formulation
and implementation, and the capacity for self-organization. California's
Regional Water Quality Control Boards, established by the 1969 PorterCologne Act, 106 could provide a useful starting point in the design of such
105. See P. Williams and S. McHugh, Water Marketingand Instream Flows: The Next Step in

ProtectingCalifornia'sInstream Values, 9 Stanford Environmental L. J. 132 (1990).
106. Cal. Water Code §13000 et seq. (West 1971 & Supp. 1991).
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institutions for regional water management governance; these hydrologic
region-defined boards would also conform to the criterion of defined common boundaries.
Since this research dealt largely with the drought responses of
urban water suppliers and customers, space has not permitted an analysis
of another perceived incongruity in distribution rules and supply flow:
the water prices paid and water use practices of farms relative to cities.
The municipal Tier 2 and 3 distributors in this study are regularly paying
as much as ten times more for water than the subsidized Central Valley
farmers, yet all of the cities' conservation sacrifices in 1991 amounted to
less water than the farmers used to grow hay. Furthermore, much of this
alfalfa grown with government-subsidized water was fed to dairy cattle to
produce surplus foods such as107milk and cheese, which are then sold at
government-supported prices.
This aspect of the utility-security debate turns on the question of
whether farmers should be allowed to keep using the low-priced irrigation contract water as they please; or if they should be allowed to indefinitely sell subsidized irrigation water to cities at much higher free market
prices; or if instead these irrigation contracts should be phased out and the
water simply sold to the highest bidder (presumably the cities), thus putting an end to uneconomical or inefficient agricultural water applications.
Lacking such incentives, in the current drought there has been precious
little evidence of water conservation by Central Valley farmers relative to
the substantial sacrifices made by municipal users (that is, until the CVP
and SWP cut them off in 1991). Yet curtailing California's agricultural
in savings equal to all indoor
water use by only 10 percent would result108
residential water consumption in the state.
In their defense, agricultural interests point out that it is much
easier for urban residents to achieve higher conservation levels because so
much of their water use is nonessential (e.g., layn watering, car washing,
swimming pool maintenance), and because conservation retrofitting of
domestic water use devices (low-flow showerheads, toilets, drip irrigation) is much less costly relative to state-of-the-art agricultural water conservation technology. In addition, farmers feel caught between the Scylla
of California's 'reasonable use' constitutional provision (a wastefully used
water right is subject to revocation of the wasted portion), and the Charybdis of the prior appropriation doctrine's 'use it or lose it' mandate (any
portion of an agricultural water right not devoted to agriculture for a
defined statutory period is also subject to revocation). This latter provision
of California's water code has been amended to allow for short-term
emergency agriculture-to-urban water use sales without jeopardizing
107. P.Passell, Greening California,N.Y. Times Feb. 27, 1991, p. D-2.
108. S. Postel, California'sLiquid Deficit, N.Y. limes, Feb. 27, 1991, p. A-27.
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agricultural rights, but long-term transfers are unlikely unless and until
California's version of prior appropriation is significantly amended.
Under California law as of 1991, not using an agricultural right for agriculture for an indefinite period created grounds for forfeiture.
Of course, if any of these proposed actions were as easily done as
said, water policy gridlock would not be the political fact of life that it has
been for most of the 1970s and 1980s. For years, one of state assembly
speaker Willie Brown's more printable nicknames was 'Farmer Brown';
although agri-business' political influence in Sacramento may be waning,
it has still proven sufficient to block major legislative water policy reform
throughout the 1980s (the most significant changes have been wrought by
the courts during this period). And while regional water governance
might sound splendid to regions with plenty of water, the notion understandably has fewer advocates in arid yet politically powerful southern
California than it does in the water-rich but more sparsely populated
north. Water traverses the length and breadth of the state, and leaders of
allocative institutions such as DWR are convinced that more extensive
regional interconnection rather than the kind of regional isolationism 1evi9
denced by Monterey and Marin are what the state desperately needs. 0
Unfortunately, while water conveyance facilities are cast in concrete, the rules governing their management are not. Vigorous northern
opposition to a peripheral canal to more efficiently transport water
through the Delta is premised on the suspicion that its control would be
dominated by southern interests, creating even more environmental damage in the north than has already occurred.
Perhaps one principle that negotiators may be able to agree on is
that no one region of the state can or should be sacrificed, either environmentally or economically, for the sake of another (implying something of
a departure from historical precedent). 110 Utility and security must find
their balance in the new water policies being contemplated in California
and elsewhere in the West, if the people of the West are to conclude that a
'commons sense' of justice can be achieved.

109. Potter interview, supra note 103.
110. See Kahrl, supra note 26.

